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IN A RECENT article in Social Science History, Flanigan and 
Zingale reviewed the old problem of inferring individual relation-
ships from aggregate data, cast doubt on Goodman's ecological 
regression technique as a method of estimating such relationships, 
and contended that the specification analysis approach to the issue 
was misleading. Instead, they argued that an ad hoc procedure 
suggested by Shively in a 1974 article was superior to Goodman's 
point estimates because it avoids dubious assumptions and forces 
investigators to make their premises clear. Comparing results 
from analyses of state-level data on major party voting in the 
1968 and 1972 presidential elections with figures from the Michi-
gan surveys, they concluded, to their satisfaction at least, that the 
assumptions required for ecological regression were badly violated 
and that it was preferable in this and other cases to use the system 
that Shively, without making any grandiose claims for it, had 
originated (Flanigan and Zingale, 1985; Goodman, 1959; Hanu-
shek eta/., 1974; Shively, 1974; Langbein and Lichtman, 1978). 
While I am always in favor of increasing the number of useful 
methods available to historians and political scientists, I will argue 
in this note: first, that Flanigan's and Zingale's comments on the 
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specification error strategy are misconceived; and second, that as 
a reanalysis of the example that they used will demonstrate, eco-
logical regression, sensitively employed, can make better use of 
· the available knowledge than does the tactic that they recommend. 
Consequently, it would be a mistake for political investigators 
who have access only to aggregate data to substitute Shively for 
Goodman. 
The inescapable problem in inferring individual from aggregate 
relationships is that we simply do not have data below the state, 
county, or, in some cases, township level. The lowest units for 
which information has been collected are black boxes that we 
cannot see into, and nothing in either Shively's or Goodman's 
methods guarantees us certain knowledge of their contents. Even 
if we luckily found a few unclosed cartons-for instance, by dis-
covering records of open ballots or party lists for scattered town-
ships, counties, or constituencies-we would still be able to guess 
the allegiances of a larger voting universe only by assuming that 
the relationships were the same in the concealed as in the un-
covered containers (Bourke and DeBats, 1978 and 1980; Elklit, 
1985; Austin eta/., 1981: 94-95). But we do have hunches, which 
may be more or less well founded, about what has gone on inside 
the bins in which we receive the data, and we can observe various 
facts about the relations between one box and another. The ques-
tion is, how should we seek to use our knowledge-in ways that 
are partially testable, or through means that are fundamentally 
indeterminate? 
In a brilliant paper in 1974, Hanushek eta/. questioned Robin-
son's famous 1950 derogation of aggregate data by showing that 
a multivariate regression model produced estimates of the indi-
vidual relations between literacy and race or foreign birth that 
were much closer to the true individual relationships than were 
those based on the bivariate equations that Robinson had earlier 
employed. A more properly specified model-that is, one that 
took into account all the available information on the correlations 
not only between the dependent and independent variables but 
also between each of these and other possible intervening vari-
ables as well could not pry open the black boxes, but it could lead 
to better-warranted conjectures about their internal composition. 
If the coefficients for the independent variables of interest changed 
markedly and their standard errors shrank when more indepen-
dent variables were added and if the proportions of variance 
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explained by the models rose appreciably, then the investigator 
had at least some evidence that the expanded regressions had 
produced more valid results. 
Flanigan and Zingale question this way of proceeding on the 
grounds that Hanushek et a/. merely estimated a different model 
and that setting their results against the individual-level bivariate 
relationships was "comparing apples and oranges-or, better yet, 
cooked cabbage and raw carrots" (Flanigan and Zingale, 1985: 
79 ). To the extent that investigators are interested solely in causal 
inferences, such as the question of what accounts for the observed 
relations between race and literacy, their point is well taken. But 
if observers are concerned as well with purely descriptive matters 
-for instance, as Robinson was, with discovering the percentages 
of illiterate whites and blacks, or native- and foreign-born persons 
who were able to read and write in 1940-then any method that 
improves the estimates of those numbers will be useful, whatever 
the number of variables on the right hand side of the equations. 
To view the matter from another angle, what do we assume 
about the other traits of the persons involved when we cross-
classify two characteristics of individuals? Suppose we have a 
table which shows how those who cast ballots for Humphrey or 
Nixon in 1968 voted in 1972. In principle, and perhaps in fact, we 
know a great deal more about the subjects, which may allow us to 
construct sub-tables showing the political behavior of, say, whites 
and blacks, men and women, managers, professionals, union and 
non-union manual workers, and the unemployed, etc. Some if not 
all of the choices of the groups captured in the sub-tables would 
differ from each other. But all these various relationships are, in 
effect, taken into account before being added together to form the 
basic two by two table for the whole population. Likewise, when 
we reduce specification errors by adding variables explicitly to the 
equation for aggregate data, we are just allowing for those sub-
categorical relationships. Mter assessing the influence of the other 
traits, we may, if we wish, derive estimates of the entries of cross-
classification tables that are of particular interest by operations 
very similar to collapsing sub-tables of individual-level data. 
To anyone working with pre-survey era data, the question of 
how this "summation" should be carried out is of some moment. 
Since it has not, to my knowledge, ever been entirely explained in 
the literature of historical statistics, it may be useful to spell it out. 
Consider equation (1), which involves only three variables. The 
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dependent variable, N72, is the percentage who voted for Nixon 
in 1972; the independent variables are the proportions for Nixon 
in 1968 (N68) and a "dummy" variable for region, which takes on 
• the value l if the voter is southern, and 0 otherwise; the B's are 
the usual OLS parameters; and e is an error term. 
(l) N72 = Bo + B1N68 + B2S +e. 
We proceed by first constructing separate two by two tables for 
each region. Northern voters who favored Humphrey in 1968 and 
McGovern in 1972 are given by Bo, since N68 and S are both zero 
by definition for such persons. The estimate of southern Demo-
cratic loyalists is Bo + B2, because N68 is zero for them and B2 
taps the deviation of southern from northern electoral patterns. 
Northerners who stayed with Nixon both times are equivalent to 
B1 - Bo, the Nixon effect less the yellow-dog Democrats, and 
southern Nixon voters are measured by B1- Bo + B2. To get the 
national two by two table, we then multiply each regional esti-
mate by the proportion of total voters in the south and north, as 
appropriate, and add them. For instance, the total percentage of 
persevering Democrats is their southern percentage times the pro-
portion of national votes that were cast in the south, plus the 
percentage of Yankees who remained Democratic times the pro-
portion of total votes recorded in the north. After determining the 
"stayers," we can calculate the "movers" by subtracting the per-
centages of the party faithful from the overall percentages for 
McGovern and Nixon in 1972. The example gives concreteness to 
the analogy with collapsing categories in tables of individual or 
survey voting records to form more general tables. 
When we have some continuous independent variables, for 
example, income, instead of only dichotomous "control" variables, 
such as in equation (2), where I stands for income, the proper 
procedure is to estimate the relationship and then determine the 
predicted percentage of the devoted and the switchers for persons 
of mean or perhaps median income. 
(2) N72 = Bo + B1N68 + B2I +e. 
By estimating the equation, we take into account the effect of I on 
the relationship between N68 and N72. To describe the most com-
mon or overall defection and stand-pat rates, those for the average 
person, therefore, we should estimate the rates for those with 
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average incomes (naturally, for other purposes, it may be impor-
tant to consider the rates for those of low or high incomes). For 
instance, Bo added to B2 times the average income yields the esti-
. mate of those who pressed the Democratic lever in both years. 
The same basic principles apply to cases in which the models 
are more complex, as in equation (3), in which variables for the 
percentage of each unit which is Catholic (C) and urban (U) have 
been added to the Nixon in 1968, income, and regional variables. 
(3) N72 = Bo + B1 N68 + B2I + B3C 
+B4U + B5S +e. 
Now, if we had information on each individual, C and U would 
be dummy variables, as S is. But if the only accessible data de-
scribe collections of voters, C and U become interval-level vari-
ables. If we focus on the stable and crossover rates for Humphrey 
and 1968 Nixon supporters, we should perform our regressions 
and then calculate those rates by setting the Catholic and urban 
proportions at their means and then multiplying by the values 
of the relevant coefficients. For example, northern Humphrey-
McGovern support would be figured by adding Bo to the products 
of three coefficients with means of the associated variables: B2 
times the average income, B3 times the average percentage Catho-
lic, and B4 times the average proportion urban. Other cell entries 
and even more complicated models can be dealt with using similar 
principles. 
This is not to say that more right hand side variables are always 
better than fewer, or that adding information will lead to very 
different estimates in every instance. Indeed, it will often be the 
case that many potential characteristics will have no substantively 
or statistically significant relationships with the dependent vari-
able, after the traits that we are mainly curious about have been 
entered into the equations, or that the intercept and the coeffi-
cients for the most crucial indexes will be only marginally affected 
by introducing other independent variables. But it is surely proper 
to reduce the error variance and the confidence intervals of the 
parameters of interest if we have other information at hand rather 
than to neglect to do so.1 And if the analyst is primarily concerned 
with determining the relations among only a subset of all the 
measured variables, then the procedures outlined for equations 
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(1) to (3) provide the proper parallel with the treatment of data on 
individuals. For those chiefly intent on description, as many his-
torians are, Flanigan and Zingale's dismissal of the specification 
approach is simply mistaken. 
Flanigan and Zingale endorse what they describe as a "con-
servative, controlled method for reducing the range of the indi-
vidual relationship." Faced with Robinson's seemingly devastating 
dismissal of aggregate data, Duncan and Davis pointed out in 
1953 that even the grouped information placed some limits on the 
possible individual level correlations. Every state had some Hum-
phrey and some McGovern voters, for example, and it is easy to 
show that in such a situation, there must have been at least a few 
people in each state who opted for the Democrats in both elec-
tions (Duncan and Davis, 1953; Flanigan and Zingale, 1985: 82 
for the quotation and 82-87 for more detail on the Duncan-Davis 
and Shively rationales). The trouble is that these constraints are 
usually so loose that we cannot even tell whether the individual 
correlations are negative or positive. To constrict these bounds, 
Shively advanced the proposition that observers might be willing 
to agree on some rules of thumb in analyzing the relationships 
between particular variables. 
Taking data from state-level returns from the 1968 and 1972 
presidential elections, Flanigan and Zingale showed that the 
Duncan-Davis method yields a range in the individual (phi or 
tau-beta) correlation of from +0.80 to -0.47, but that with "rea-
sonable" assumptions, Shively's strategy constricts that to the 
interval between +0.76 and +0.48. The more restrictive the as-
sumptions, the narrower the limits. Using survey data from 36 
states, they demonstrated that the "true" phi is +0.60, while the 
estimate derived from bivariate ecological regression on state-level 
election returns is +0. 74. Moreover, when they divided the survey 
data by states, they found considerable variation in phi coefficients 
from state to state, throwing doubt on an assumption crucial 
to ecological regression-that the within-area relationships differ 
only randomly from each other. Like Robinson, they seemingly 
invalidated a fairly widely used technique with a striking example, 
and they improved on his performance by offering a less drastic 
solution than the total abandonment of what is usually for his-
torians the only available information. 
Fortunately for those who have used ecological regression or 
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who intend to in the future, Flanigan's and Zingale's arguments 
are unsound. There are four difficulties particular to their discus-
sion of the example. First, answers to surveys do not, as Flanigan 
· and Zingale recognize, precisely reflect what happens in the elec-
tion booth.2 The observed discrepancy between the results from 
home-administered questionnaires and voting returns probably 
partly reflects the fact that each source describes a related but 
different action. Second, since a national sample is not drawn to 
be representative of state electorates but only of the nation, survey 
data broken down by states do not provide a reliable standard 
against which to test the assumptions of ecological regression. 
Third, state-level data are so highly aggregated that it is hardly 
surprising that they yield imprecise estimates of personal voting 
patterns. Fourth, the proportions of loyalists and crossover voters 
estimated by bivariate ecological regression in this case are not 
really all that different from the survey results, even with grossly 
consolidated data. Relative to the "true" proportions found in 
the survey, the simplest Goodman-type procedure overestimates 
Nixon loyalism by five percent and underestimates Democratic 
defections from McGovern by II%.3 
There are also two larger problems with the Shively technique 
in general that greatly diminish its usefulness. First, its weak 
tests apply only to the units that are the most behaviorally ho-
mogeneous. Second, it does not make use of all the available 
information. 
Consider Table I, which shows hypothetical individual voting 
patterns (the "partials" or internal cell entries) grouped into units 
by area (the totals or "marginals"). If both elections are very close, 
as in Panel A, and if nearly all units have roughly equal marginal 
percentages, then a wide variety of assumptions about the internal 
cell entries will be consistent with the data, and the Shively 
bounds will be extremely broad (similarly, the bivariate ecological 
regression coefficients will have large standard errors). In this 
instance, from 4% to 100% of the Democrats and o% to 100% 
of the Republicans might have voted the same way in both elec-
tions. Since the only test on the assumptions (e.g., that at least 
half of Humphrey's voters supported McGovern) that his tactic 
allows is whether the posited partials could mathematically add 
up to the marginals, there will be few clear tests in such a situa-
tion. Any attempt to impose arbitrary and untestable constraints 
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Tabler Hypothetical examples of individual 
votes aggregated into areal units 
Dl* Rl Total Dl Rl Total 
Panel A: Cliffhanger elections mean wide bounds 
D2 51 0 51 2 49 51 
R2 0 49 49 49 0 49 
Tot. 51 49 roo 51 49 100 
Panel B: One landslide election narrows the estimates 
D2 51 39 90 41 49 90 
R2 0 10 10 10 0 10 
Tot. 51 49 roo 51 49 100 
Panel C: Extreme and divergent patterns also lead to wide bounds 
D2 
R2 
Tot. 
85-90 
0-5 
90 . 
0-5 
5-10 
10 
90 
10 
roo 
5-10 
0-5 
10 
0-5 
Ss-go 
90 
10 
90 
100 
*Entries are percentages. Categories are Democratic in first election (D I}, 
Republican in first election (RI }, Democratic in second election (D2}, Repub-
lican in second election (R2), and totals for each election (tot.). In Panel C. 
entries are possible ranges of percentages. 
will be controversial, for what appears reasonable to one person 
may be ludicrous to another. 
If one or more elections is a landslide, or if most units are all 
close to unanimous in the same direction in at least one of the two 
elections, as in Panel B, then the limits will be much more binding 
and the tests much more useful. In this case, Democratic cross-
overs could have amounted to no more than 20%, and Republican 
defections to no more than 22%. Both the Shively tactic and bi-
variate regression will perform well in this circumstance. 
A third idealized case, given in Panel C, in which the internal 
cell entries give the range of possible partials that could satisfy the 
marginals, seems to me the one most likely to occur in county or 
township level data. In this instance, the marginals for both units 
are entirely stable, and while one is overwhelmingly Democratic, 
the other is just as solidly Republican. Defection rates for each 
party could range from o% to 50%. When there are only a few 
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such counties, the analyst must choose between admitting that his 
assumptions are violated a certain number of times without being 
able to determine how many is too many, or publishing only a 
· very broad estimate, which will not go very far towards answering 
the questions that he or she is presumably most interested in. In 
other words, in what seems likely to be a fairly typical situation 
confronting historical investigators, Shively's weak tests will either 
have to be jettisoned or the results will be vague and unsatisfying. 
In contrast, ecological regression may be able to produce accu-
rate estimates in this third case. Shively's method focuses entirely 
on the relationships between the partials and marginals for only 
two variables, ignoring whatever knowledge we may have of other 
variables. If the historian instead uses multiple regression, he or 
she can employ such data and can make use of much more power-
ful means of evaluating the validity of his or her models. The key 
to seeing this is to ask why the voting patterns in the units in 
Panel C of Table I diverge so much from each other. The answer 
is that the areas differ in other respects as well, which in many 
cases will be measurable. One is, say, nearly all white, one pre-
dominantly black, or one Protestant, the other Catholic, or one 
urban, the other rural, and so on. If we have sufficient data, we 
can take these extraneous variables into account in a multiple 
regression equation and obtain better estimates of the overhli 
cohesion of the two parties over two elections than with bivariate 
regression and much more precise estimates than with the strategy 
of intuitive and largely untestable hunches that Flanigan and 
Zingale propose. 
Let us focus on their example. The single most obvious fact 
about the comparison between the I968 and I972 elections is that 
in the former there were three significant candidates but in the 
latter only two. While George Wallace's disproportionate appeal 
in the south muddles estimates of the major party voting patterns 
from aggregate data, it suggests at the same time better models, 
that is, models including regional dummy variables.4 Equation 
(I), discussed earlier, and equation (4), given below, represent 
two ways to operationalize regional effects. In equation (I), it was 
assumed that equations for the south and the non-south merely 
had different intercepts. Equation (4) may be used to test the 
hypothesis that within each region the slope of the relationships 
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Table 2 Ecological regression equations for 50 states and the 
District of Columbia, 1968 and 1972 U.S. presidential elections* 
Model# 2 3 
Constant .0498 (o.86) .0891 (1.98) .0149 (0.37) 
Nixon '68 .6541 (5.57) .6278 (6.97) ·7796 (9.6 I) 
South -.1041 (-5.95) 
·3723 (3.70) 
S * N68 --9905 (-4·78) 
R2 
.388 .648 .763 
adj. R2 
·375 .633 ·748 
*Entries are regression coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. Variables are: 
Nixon '68 %of two-party vote for Nixon in 1968, 
South 1 for 11 ex-Confederate states, Kentucky, and Oklahoma, 
S * N68 
R2 
adj. R2 
o otherwise, 
Nixon 1968 percentage if state was in South, o otherwise, 
percentage of variance explained, 
R 2 adjusted for degrees of freedom, dependent variable in 
all equations is % of two-party vote for Nixon in 1972. 
between voting for Nixon in I968 and in I972 differed as well. 
Thus, the variable S times N68 in equation (4) reflects the inter-
action between Nixon support and the regional effect. 
(4) N72 = Bo + B,N68 + BzS + B3SN68 +e. 
The important advantage of such a model, which IS equivalent to 
dividing the data into sets of the northern and southern states and 
running separate regressions on each group, is that it allows tests 
of the hypotheses.5 If Bz and B3 are statistically significant and 
the proportion of variance explained, adjusted for the diminished 
degrees of freedom, rises, then we know that we have better es-
timates of the relationships between the marginal proportions. 
There is no counterpart in the Shively method. 
What results do we get if we apply this method to the 1968 and 
I972 state-level election data? Table 2 contains estimates of three 
ecological regression equations: a bivariate model and the more 
complex models given in equations (I) and (4). The increases 
from Model I to Model 3 in the variance explained and in the t-
statistics for N68, and the fact that the t-statistics for both the 
intercept and the slope for the regional dummies are greater than 
2.0, which corresponds to a level of significance greater than 0.05, 
show that the more complex equations fit the aggregate marginals 
better than Model I does. 
They also yield estimates of the individual transition matrix 
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Table 3 The estimates implied by the Models in Table 2 
compared to the "true" survey picture of the I968-I972 elections* 
Panel A: The survey estimates 
I 968 Election 
Nixon 
Humphrey 
I972 Election 
Nixon 
90.2 
32-4 
McGovern 
Panel B: Estimates from Model I (bivariate) 
I972 Election 
I 968 Election 
Nixon 
Humphrey 
Nixon McGovern 
Total 
IOO.O 
IOO.O 
Total 
100.0 
IOO.O 
Panel C: Estimates from Model 2 (regional intercept differences) 
I972 Election 
Nixon McGovern 
I 968 Election 
Nixon 93·4 6.6 
Humphrey 30.9 69.I 
Panel D: Estimates from Model 3 (regional intercept and 
slope differences) 
I 968 Election 
Nixon 
Humphrey 
I972 Election 
Nixon 
90.I 
34·6 
McGovern 
9·9 
65·4 
*Entries are percentages, which add to 100% across rows. 
Total 
IOO.O 
100.0 
Total 
IOO.O 
100.0 
that are closer to the survey results. Table 3 compares the per-
centage estimates implied by the equations in Table 2 with the 
"true" percentages from the Michigan survey given in Flanigan 
and Zingale's article. While Model 1 overestimates the Nixon 
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admirers by 4.8% and underestimates the McGovern haters by 
2.8%, Model 2 and especially Model 3 are nearer the mark. Model 
3 reproduces the 1972 behavior of 1968 Republican voters almost 
·exactly and overestimates Democratic loyalty by only 2.2%. Flani-
gan's and Zingale's bounds, on the other hand, imply percentage 
estimates for the Nixonians of from 85.5% to 95.0%, and of 
Democrats disgruntled with McGovern of from 21.1% to 39.5%. 
While the near misses of Model 3 would, I believe, satisfy most 
historians, a range of Humphrey defectors of from one in five to 
two in five would cause considerable consternation.6 
When Shively first introduced the modified Duncan-Davis 
bounds procedure, he claimed only that it "may be a useful sup-
plement to ecological regression" (Shively, 1974: 71). Flanigan 
and Zingale were less reserved and sought to replace ecological 
regression entirely. But their critique of the specification approach 
to the problem was misleading, and a more subtle analysis of their 
example demonstrates why and how ecological regression can be 
made much more· useful to historians than the technique that 
Flanigan and Zingale favor. Their article will have served a useful 
purpose, however, if it contributes to a more complete under-
standing of the problems of using aggregate data to estimate the 
behavior of individuals and if it leads historians to employ more 
sensitive and complex models. 
NOTES 
I freely admit that before the Hanushek et a/. article, I did not see this 
solution as clearly as I have since, and that the estimates in Kousser (1974) 
might in some cases have been improved if I had understood it better. 
2 Flanigan and Zingale (1985: 72) starkly contrast the "imaginative" use of 
survey data on the recall during the 1950s of their votes during the 1920s by 
Andersen (I979) and Butler and Stokes (I969), with the "uncritical" use of 
ecological regression by unnamed historians. They fail to note the devastat-
ing critiques of the recall data in those works by Niemi eta/. (I980) and 
Katz eta/. (1980) and perhaps underestimate the care with which at least 
some political historians have tried to test the validity of the methods that 
they used for their particular data sets. In fact, after a long honeymoon 
with surveys, political scientists have recently begun to see many virtues in 
more aggregated data. See, e.g., Kramer (1983); Ingelhart (1985). 
3 The estimates below in Table 2, Model 1 are even closer to the survey 
results because I used all 50 states plus the District of Columbia, whereas 
they used only the aggregate data from 36 states. If the survey sample was 
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chosen to be nationally representative, then it broke the analogy for Flani-
gan and Zingale to restrict the aggregate estimates to 36 states. 
4 It seems somewhat strange that Flanigan and Zingale themselves did not 
attempt to estimate a more complex ecological regression model with 
southern dummy variables, for they noted that they might have applied 
different assumptions to each region in a Shively-type analysis, and they 
have elsewhere remarked that "Perhaps dummy variable analysis offers the 
simplest and most promising expansion in the use of multiple regression 
introduced in recent years." Flanigan and Zingale (I985: 86; and I98I: 
260). 
5 For a fuller description of the dummy variable procedure and proof that 
equation (4) is equivalent to running separate regressions on subsets of 
variables, see Johnston (I984: 225-27). 
6 Flanigan and Zingale state their bounds as individual tau-beta coefficients, 
which for two by two tables are equivalent to phi coefficients, but the range 
of individual percentages corresponding to those bounds can be recaptured 
for a table with given marginals by guessing at the percentages, calculating 
the phi's, and then repeating the process until one gets the correct phi's. It 
is unclear to me why anyone would be interested in the range of tau betas, 
which signify only proportionate error reduction, rather than in the per-
centages, which have a meaningful substantive interpretation. Since few 
historians are familiar with tau betas-those with memories as bad as mine 
have to rush off to old statistics texts to review the meaning and formulas 
for such statistics each time that they run into them-using them only adds 
mystification to an already sufficiently arcane practice. 
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